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Inflation Targeting in India: A Comparison with Multiple Indicator Approach 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
  
The empirical literature on identification and measurement of the impact of monetary policy 
shocks on the real side of the economy is fairly comprehensive for developed economies but 
very limited for emerging and transition economies. In this study, we propose an 
identification scheme, for a developing economy (taking India as a case study), which is able 
to capture the monetary transmission mechanism without giving rise to empirical anomalies. 
We use a VAR approach with recursive contemporaneous restrictions and identify monetary 
policy shocks by modelling the reaction function of the central bank and structure of the 
economy. The effect of monetary policy shocks on the exchange rate and other 
macroeconomic variables is consistent with the predictions of a broad set of theoretical 
models. This set-up is used to build a hypothetical case of inflation targeting where the 
monetary policy instrument is set after looking at the current values of inflation only. This is 
in contrast with the ‘multiple indicator approach’ currently followed by the Reserve Bank of 
India. The results in this study suggest that the demand effects of interest rate are stronger 
than exchange rate effects and there is evidence of mitigation of potential conflict between 
exchange rate and interest rate, one of main monetary policy dilemmas of the RBI, in the 
inflation targeting case. 
 
Keywords: India, Inflation Targeting, Monetary policy, VAR 
 
JEL codes: E52, E58, E47 
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1. Introduction 
 
“Monetary Policy is conventionally understood to represent policies, objectives and 
instruments directed towards regulating money supply and the cost and availability of credit 
in the economy (Balachandran, 1998). The monetary policy framework can thus be described 
as deciding the ultimate objectives first; then the intermediate target and lastly the operating 
procedures of monetary policy involving optimal choice of policy instruments to achieve the 
ultimate objectives.” 
 
The monetary policy framework in India has undergone various transformations since the 
beginning of the economic planning in 1951. The monetary policy framework, at the 
beginning of the planning period, could be best described as “controlled expansion” of the 
money supply. It was determined mainly by the fiscal stance. It was being formulated against 
the backdrop of large budget deficits. The main task of the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) was 
to contain the adverse effects of monetization1. India switched to a monetary targeting 
framework in the mid 1980s. Monetary Targeting was pursued in a very flexible manner with 
a ‘feedback’ from the real sector of the economy. This was necessary because of the high 
level of government borrowings and administered interest rates. During this phase, the two 
core objectives of monetary policy were maintaining price stability and provision of adequate 
credit to the productive sectors of the economy.  
 
                                               
 
1
 Monetization of the deficit is the increase in net RBI credit to the government which, in turn, is the increase in 
the RBI’s holding of government dated securities, 91-day treasury bills and rupee coins for changes in cash 
balances with the Reserve Bank.  
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The policy environment, framework and strategies underwent a distinct change in the early 
1990s when India adopted economic reforms in 1991 after a balance of payment crisis. 
Monetary policy had to deal with traditional issues along with the new issues brought about 
by the changed economic policy environment. Deregulation and liberalization of financial 
markets started casting doubt on the appropriateness of exclusive reliance on money as the 
only intermediate target in the late 1990s. The expansion of money supply emanating from 
monetization of the government deficit and rising capital inflows rendered the control of 
monetary aggregates more difficult. The gradual opening up of the Indian economy from the 
1990s also increased the upward risks to domestic inflation. This emanated from large capital 
inflows in the economy and a host of other global factors to which domestic inflation was 
increasingly becoming more responsive. The transition of economic policies from a 
controlled to liberalized but regulated regime has been reflected in the changes in monetary 
management in India. The monetary policy framework in India changed from ‘pure monetary 
targeting strategy’ to a ‘Multiple Indicator Approach (MPA)’ in 1998-19992. Though, the 
basic objectives of monetary policy of price stability and ensuring availability of credit to 
productive sectors have remained intact, the underlying operating procedures have undergone 
significant changes. The main attributes of monetary policy in India from mid 1980s to 
present is summarized in the Table 1. 
------------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 1 here 
------------------------------------------------ 
 
                                               
 
2
 Though, the ‘multiple indicator approach’ was formally adopted in April 1998, the change in the operating 
procedure of monetary policy was visible after 1995 only as our analysis in the next section suggests. 
 
4 
 
 
This new approach bestowed the RBI with the required flexibility to formulate monetary 
policy in the face of ongoing financial liberalization and increasing openness. The array of 
indirect instruments of monetary control available to the RBI has subsequently expanded to 
maintain orderly conditions in the money and foreign exchange market (Gupta et.al, 2000). 
The Liquidity Adjustment Facility (LAF) was introduced in 2000, which enabled the RBI to 
manage liquidity on a daily basis. The LAF is used for absorbing and injecting liquidity 
through repo and reverse repo operations on a variable rate basis. It has helped in keeping the 
movements of overnight call rate within a specified corridor and provided monetary 
authorities with greater flexibility in determining both the quantum of adjustment and rates 
by responding to the needs of the system on a daily basis. However, the increasing openness 
of the Indian economy, market determined exchange rate and large capital inflows 
necessitated sterilizing capital inflows and foreign exchange market intervention. It was 
initially done through Open Market Operations (OMO) but limited stock of government 
securities with the RBI under OMO curbed its ability to sterilize. The burden of sterilization 
consequently shifted to the LAF, which was essentially a tool of marginal liquidity 
adjustment. In order to absorb liquidity of enduring nature using instrument other than LAF, 
Market Stabilization Scheme (MSS) was launched in 2004. The instruments of short-term 
(treasury bills) and medium-term (dated securities) maturities were issued by the government 
to the RBI under MSS for absorbing liquidity from the system. The MSS empowered RBI to 
absorb liquidity on a more enduring but temporary basis leaving LAF for daily liquidity 
management and using OMO on a more enduring basis (Mohan, 2008).   
 
The monetary management in India has been credible so far but the increasing integration of 
the Indian economy into the world economy after 2000 has lead to the transmission of 
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uncertainties related to world financial and oil markets, into the domestic (Indian) economy, 
hence, making the macroeconomic environment more unpredictable. The monetary 
framework in India has to adjust to rapid capital inflows and outflows. In this changed 
scenario, the MPA of monetary policy, which is currently followed by the RBI, does not 
seem to work effectively. The multiplicity of objectives leads to inherent conflict among such 
objectives in this environment. This approach is creating a conflict between exchange rate 
stabilization and inflation stabilization leaving the market confused as which variable the RBI 
will choose to defend3. The monetary impact of capital flows has become a subject of serious 
discussion in the recent period.  The MSS, as the policy instrument for checking monetary 
expansion out of capital flows, is not working well as incomplete sterilization under MSS is 
leading to rapid growth in money supply and credit and thus fuelling inflation. The   interest 
costs of MSS is also growing and resulting in large public expenditure4. This changed 
scenario calls for a change to the monetary policy framework to ensure it is transparent and 
forward-looking with accountability on the part of the central Bank. Inflation targeting by its 
very nature, encompasses all these properties. 
 
Mishra and Mishra (2009) analyzed the preconditions for inflation targeting in India and 
assessed its suitability as a monetary policy framework for India. They built sector specific 
Vector Auto-regression (VAR) models and suggested that the Indian economy satisfies the 
preconditions for inflation targeting. Extending the analysis of Mishra and Mishra (2009) this 
paper builds a short run comprehensive VAR model of monetary policy for the Indian 
economy to examine a hypothetical inflation targeting monetary policy regime for India.  
                                               
 
3
 To see how refer, for example,  to  D’souza(2003) and  Shah (2007) 
4
 Refer to D’souza(2003) and  Shah (2007) 
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 The VAR model presented is subjected to monetary policy shocks as different models 
respond differently to monetary policy shocks. The response of major macroeconomic 
variables to these shocks will help us determine the type of theoretical model, which can 
explain all the possible interrelationships among macroeconomic variables and thus fit the 
framework of the Indian economy better among the variety of models available. Moreover 
given the theoretical consistency of responses of various macroeconomic variables to 
monetary shocks, we can conduct the hypothetical experiment of inflation targeting in the 
above specified VAR model5.  
 
Since, the variables are simultaneously determined over time, an identification assumption on 
contemporaneous causality6 is required to be able to isolate monetary policy shocks. We 
assume that the policy shock is orthogonal to the variables RBI considers while setting its 
policy instrument. This is referred to as the recursiveness assumption. The economic 
implication of the recursiveness assumption is that time t variables in the RBI’s information 
set do not respond to time t realizations of monetary policy shocks.  
 
This study contributes to the literature in several ways; first, it suggests an identification 
scheme which is able to the capture monetary transmission mechanism for a developing 
economy like India; secondly, it gives preliminary evidence on how an inflation targeting 
                                               
 
5
 This approach is based on Lucas’ methodology (see, Christiano et al., 1999). 
6
 We placed only short-run restrictions (i.e. restrictions on contemporaneous causality) to identify monetary 
policy shocks. We did not go into the long-run restrictions structure. Since, we are limiting ourselves to short 
run (that is the period up to one year); we do not consider issues related to cointegration, which basically studies 
the existence of long-run equilibrium. . 
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regime would work for India; and lastly, it will provide implications for the theoretical model 
which can be used to model monetary policy evolution for India. 
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows:  Section 2 reviews the literature related to the 
effects of monetary policy shocks; section 3 presents a brief discussion of the VAR and 
structural VAR methodology as employed in the paper; section 4 outlines structure of the 
VAR model and the description of the variables included in the model; section 5 presents 
empirical results and their discussion and section 6 concludes.  
2. Review of Literature 
The literature on the identification of the effects of monetary policy shock to real economy is 
based on the assumptions about the nature of interaction of this shock with the variables in 
the central bank’s feedback rule, i.e., the rule which relates the central bank’s action to the 
state of the economy. One assumption is that the policy shock is orthogonal to the variables in 
the feedback rule, usually referred to as ‘recursiveness’ assumption (Christiano et al., 1999). 
Much of the work on identification of monetary policy shocks using recursiveness approach 
is centred on U.S. economy. Some of these studies mainly concentrates on defining the 
appropriate policy instrument, whose innovations could be called monetary policy shocks, for 
example, McCallum (1983), Bernanke and Blinder (1992), Eichenbaum (1992), and 
Christiano and Eichenbaum (1995), Strogin (1995) and so forth; while other studies mainly 
deal with the effect of monetary policy shocks on various aspects of real economy, for 
example, Bernanke and Blinder (1992), Christiano and Eichenbaum (1995), Gertler and 
Gilchrist (1994), Eichenbaum and Evans (1995), Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1996) 
including others. 
8 
 
The approach to identify the effects of monetary policy shocks assuming recursiveness 
corresponds to a notion that economic variables within certain period are determined in a 
block recursive way. This implies that variables denoting a ‘Goods Market’(non policy 
variables like output, employment, prices etc) are determined first, then the central bank sets 
its policy instrument and after that the remaining variables in the money market (policy 
variables like interest rates, credit money supply etc) are determined. Thus abandoning the 
recursiveness assumption implies dropping the assumption that the central bank only looks at 
the variables that are predetermined relative to monetary policy shock. Some of the main 
studies done using non-recursive approach of identification of monetary policy shocks 
include Sims (1986), Gorden and Leeper (1994), Leeper, Sims and Zha (1996) and Sims and 
Zha (2006) among others. 
The empirical literature that has dealt with the effects of monetary policy shocks has found 
evidence of several anomalies in both open and closed economy settings. These puzzles as 
summarized by Kim and Roubini (2000 p.562) are namely the liquidity puzzle, the price 
puzzle, the exchange rate puzzle and the forward discount bias puzzle7. Many studies in the 
empirical literature have attempted to deal with these puzzles and provided suggestions to 
explain them, for example Sims (1992) tried to explain the liquidity puzzle, the studies by 
Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1996) and Sims and Zha (2006) dealt with solving the 
price puzzle, the studies by Grilli and Roubini (1995), and Cushman and Zha (1997) 
attempted to explain and solve the exchange rate puzzle for non U.S. G-7 countries and the 
study by Kim and Roubini (2000) proposed an identification scheme which was successful in 
                                               
 
7
 For a discussion of the literature that has encountered the mentioned puzzles, refer to Kim and Roubini (2000).   
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solving the liquidity and exchange rate puzzle and also the forward discount bias puzzle to 
some extent for non U.S. G-7 countries.   
2.1 Studies on Monetary Policy in India 
The existing literature on identification of monetary policy shocks and their impact on the 
Indian economy is limited8. However, there are some studies available which remotely dealt 
with the subject. Singh and Kalirajan (2006), for example, modelled the RBI policy reaction 
function to see how policy stance decisions9 respond to the changes in goal variables; 
namely, output, inflation and the exchange rate. They found that the transmission effects of 
the RBI’s policy stances on the goal variables are not very effective. They suggested that RBI 
should not be simultaneously working with instruments of quantity and price control. It 
should concentrate more on price variables for conducting monetary policy with effective 
interest rate as the main policy instrument. 
Singh and Kalirajan (2007) examined the efficacy of interest rate channel of monetary 
transmission in India in the post reform period10. They formulated cointegrated vector 
autoregression model with generalized restrictions using an open economy framework. Their 
analysis suggests an important role for interest rate in monetary transmission in post reform 
India. They concluded that monetary targeting has lost its relevance and the RBI should 
strengthen its effort to make interest rate the main instrument of monetary policy. 
Mohan (2008), surveying the monetary policy transmission for India, suggested that 
monetary policy impulses impact prices and output through interest rate and exchange rate 
                                               
 
8
 For literature on inflation targeting as a monetary policy option for India, refer to Mishra and Mishra (2009). 
9
 For details on policy instruments and modelling of reaction functions, refer to Singh and Kalirajan (2006). 
10
 The process of economic reforms has started in India in 1991. 
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movements along with the monetary and credit aggregates. He further suggested that 
emerging market economies like India should allow greater flexibility for the exchange rate 
and, at the same time, maintain an adequate level of foreign exchange reserves in view of the 
volatility observed in international capital flows. 
There are also a few descriptive studies available which deal with the issues of monetary 
policy formulation (for e.g., Rangarajan (2001) and Vasudevan (2002)), limitations and 
constraints in pursuing monetary policy objectives (for e.g., Kanagasabapathy (2001)) and 
challenges faced by monetary policy due to increasing financial market reforms and growing 
linkages to the world economy (for e.g., Ramchandran (2000), Nachane (2005)). 
3. Methodology 
The monetary policy shock is identified as the disturbance term in an equation of the form 
 = Ω + 	

																																																																																													1                                                                                    
Here 	is the instrument of monetary policy and   is a linear function that relates 	to the 
information set	Ω. The random variable		

 is a monetary policy shock. 
3.1 Vector Autoregression 
A VAR is a convenient device for summarizing first and second order moment properties of 
the data. The basic problem with VAR is that a given set of second moments is consistent 
with many such dynamic response functions. Solving this problem amounts to making 
explicit assumptions that justify focusing on a particular dynamic response function. A VAR 
for a k-dimensional vector of variables , is given by 
 =  +  +⋯……………… + ,  = Σ																	2 
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Here,  is a nonnegative integer and  is uncorrelated with all variables dated (t-1) and 
earlier. Knowing
, the  and  are not sufficient to compute the dynamic response 
function of to the fundamental economic shock in the economy. The basic reason is that µt 
is the one step ahead forecast error in
 
 . Each element of  	reflects the effect of all the 
fundamental economic shocks. There is no reason to presume that any element of 
corresponds to a particular economic shock, for example, a monetary policy shock.  
This shortcoming can be overcome by rewriting (2) in terms of mutually uncorrelated 
innovations. Suppose we had a matrix 	such that	Σ = . If we had such a P, 
then	Σ =  !. This implies that  can be used to orthogonalize . Choosing  is 
similar to placing identification restrictions on the system of dynamic simultaneous 
equations. Sims (1980) popularized the method of choosing  to be the Cholesky 
decomposition of	Σ. The impulse response functions based on this choice of  are known as 
the orthogonalized impulse response functions. Choosing  to be the Cholesky 
decomposition of  is equivalent to imposing a recursive structure for the corresponding 
dynamic structural equation model. 
3.3 Structural Vector Autoregression 
An alternative to the recursive VAR or temporal ordering of variables is to allow for a more 
elaborate set of restrictions guided by economic theory. This is referred to as a structural 
VAR (SVAR). The SVAR approach integrates the need to identify the causal impulse 
response functions into the model specification and estimation process. Sufficient 
identification restrictions can be obtained by placing either short run or long run restrictions 
12 
 
on the model. In this exercise we are going to make use of the structural autoregression with 
short run restrictions. The short run SVAR model (following from equation2) can be written 
as: 
 − ……………………−  =  = #$ 																								3 
                        
Here, A and B are KXK non-singular matrices of parameters to be estimated and $	is a KX1 
vector of disturbances for all s≠t. Sufficient constraints must be placed on 	and #	so that 
	is identified. The short run SVAR model chooses  = # to identify causal impulse 
response functions. 
4. Data and Variables 
The model, used in this study, consists of eight variables, chosen to explain all-possible 
interrelations between the policy and non-policy variables. The eight variables included in the 
model consist of two foreign variables and six domestic variables. These form two blocks in 
the model; one is the foreign block with two variables and next is the domestic block with six 
variables. The foreign variables are block exogenous to the system. It implies that domestic 
variables are not entering into the equations of foreign variables either contemporaneously or 
with a lag. This assumption is made due to the small size of the Indian economy relative to 
the world economy, which makes it unlikely that domestic variables can explain movements 
in foreign variables either contemporaneously or with a lag. 
The data for the domestic variables has been collected from the, ‘Handbook of Statistics on 
the Indian economy, 2005’ an annual publication of the RBI. The crude oil prices data has 
been sourced from the IMF (http://www.imf.org/external/np/res/commod/datar.csv) and the 
data for federal funds rate (a proxy for foreign interest rate) is taken from the Federal Reserve 
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Bank of New-York (http://www.newyorkfed.org/). The period of analysis for this exercise 
covers from 1996 January to 2005 March11. 
4.1 Variables Included in the Model 
The foreign variables included in the model are oil prices and the federal funds rate. The oil 
prices are crude oil prices and this is the simple average of three spot prices; Dated Brent, 
West Texas Intermediate and the Dubai Fateh. The federal funds rate is taken as a proxy for 
international interest rates. The domestic variables included in the model are three non-policy 
variables and three policy variables. Non-policy variables are inflation (measured by a rate of 
change in wholesale price index (WPI)), outputgap (measured as a difference between (log 
of) ‘index of industrial production’ (IIP) and its (log of) Hodrick-Prescott trend), exchange 
rate (as measured by nominal effective exchange rate (NEER)), monetary policy instrument, 
gross bank credit (GBC) and broad monetary aggregate (M3).  The growth rate of reserve 
money (M0) and the call money rate (CMR) are used as monetary policy instruments 
(MPI).12 The yield of SGL transactions on treasury bills of 91 days (91 day Treasury bill rate) 
has also been tried as a monetary policy instrument. 
 
4.2 Structure of the Model 
                                               
 
11
 This period is chosen because the macro-stabilization program undertaken after the balance-of-payment crisis 
in 1991 started to show its effect after 1995. And this period was a stable and normal period for formulating an 
economic model.  
12
 The yield of SGL transactions on treasury bills of 91 days (91 day Treasury bill rate) had also been tried as a 
monetary policy instrument. The model with 91 day treasury bill rate gave theoretically inconsistent responses 
of output and exchange rate to monetary policy shocks. This may be due to the fact that in the period considered 
here, the monetary policy stance of the RBI was the provision of adequate liquidity to meet credit growth and 
support investment demand and also to keep vigil on the prices and exchange rate.  The RBI mainly influences 
liquidity in the economy to achieve the mentioned objectives and to influence liquidity the RBI intervenes 
through the money market. Thus money market rate (CMR) is the better indicator of the stance of the monetary 
policy. 
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The following identification structure has been used to isolate monetary policy shocks: 
X' =
(
))
))
*
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0a 1 0 0 0 0 0 0a- a- 1 0 0 0 0 0a. a. a.- 1 0 0 0 0a/ a/ a/- a/. 1 0 0 0a0 a0 a0- a0. a0/ 1 0 0a1 a1 a1- a1. a1/ a10 1 0a2 a2 a2- a2. a2/ a20 a21 13
44
44
5
(
))
))
*
oilffrateyinfneermpm3bc 3
44
44
5
 
 
This characterizes the restrictions placed on the contemporaneous relationships among 
variables. Here, ‘oil’ is the world oil prices, ‘ffrate’ is the federal funds rate, ‘y’ is outputgap, 
‘inf’ is WPI inflation, ‘neer’ is NEER, ‘mp’ is the monetary policy instrument, and ‘m3’is 
broad monetary aggregate and ‘bc’ is gross bank credit. The growth rate of reserve money 
(M0) and the call money rate (CMR)13 have been used as monetary policy instruments. Here, 
oil and ffrate form the foreign block and the remaining variables form the domestic block. In 
the domestic block outputgap (y) inflation (inf), and the nominal effective exchange rate 
(neer) form the non-policy block and monetary policy instrument, broad monetary aggregate 
(m3) and gross bank credit (bc) form the policy block. The ordering of variables within each 
block, namely, foreign, non policy domestic and policy domestic is based on the results of 
pair-wise Granger causality testing as represented in Table 2. 
------------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 2 here 
                                              ----------------------------------------------- 
                                               
 
13
 It is noteworthy that CMR is not the instrument of monetary policy. It is only an indicator of monetary policy 
stance and the prevailing liquidity situation in the economy. At the most it can act only as a proxy for the 
instrument of monetary policy. CMR may not be a very robust proxy for monetary policy instrument as it is 
only a money market rate, however changes in CMR accurately reflected the monetary policy stance during the 
period of analysis, therefore we used it as an instrument of the monetary policy.  
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The non-zero coefficients aij in the above structure indicate that variable ‘j’ affects variable ‘i’ 
instantaneously. The coefficients on the diagonal are normalized to 1. The system is exactly 
identified. The international shocks can affect the domestic economy rapidly. Thus, the 
foreign block variables have an instant effect on all the variables in the domestic block. 
Output is made to respond to inflation contemporaneously14. The ‘monetary policy 
instrument’ equation reflects that it has been set after looking at current values of inflation, 
outputgap and exchange rate. This assumption is valid for a developing economy like India, 
where central bank has multiple objectives. Unlike the structure followed for a developed 
economy (as in Sims and Zha (1995) or Kim and Roubini (2000)) where the exchange rate is 
considered to be a financial variable and assumed to be affected by all the variables instead of 
affecting them contemporaneously, in a developing economy central bankers are concerned 
about movements in exchange rate and take quick actions to smooth out fluctuations. M3 and 
credit are placed in a policy block after the monetary policy instrument and are assumed to 
react to monetary policy instrument contemporaneously. 
4.3 Pure Inflation Targeting Case 
In the above-described model, the Reserve Bank’s monetary policy reaction function is 
represented by the ‘mp’ equation. This has been made to react contemporaneously to shocks 
in inflation, output gap and the exchange rate. This is more in line with the ‘multiple indicator 
approach’ currently followed by the RBI. To put the case of pure inflation targeting in the 
above structure, we allow only inflation to enter in the monetary policy reaction function as 
                                               
 
14
 This assumption is motivated by the fact that nominal incomes are fixed in the short-run, meaning so is 
nominal spending.   
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represented by the ‘mp’ equation. Thus the contemporaneous restriction matrix has been 
modified in the following way for the pure inflation targeting scenario: 
 
X' =
(
))
))
*
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0a 1 0 0 0 0 0 0a- a- 1 0 0 0 0 0a. a. a.- 1 0 0 0 0a/ a/ a/- a/. 1 0 0 0a0 a0 0 a0. 0 1 0 0a1 a1 a1- a1. a1/ a10 1 0a2 a2 a2- a2. a2/ a20 a21 13
44
44
5
(
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*
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In this scenario while setting up the ‘monetary policy’ instrument the RBI looks at only 
inflation. However these restrictions are only on the contemporaneous coefficients and this 
does not prevent the central bank responding to other variables with a lag.    
It is also notable that Inflation forecasts play a central role in inflation targeting framework 
because it is a forward-looking regime where central bank attempt to control inflation over a 
targeting horizon of one to two years. Since, central banks do not have perfect control over 
inflation and inflation reacts to monetary policy changes with long and variable lags and also 
affected by factors other than monetary policy, inflation forecasts provides for an ideal 
intermediate target. Keeping this in view, an alternative scenario has been built where the 
actual inflation is replaced with the forecasted inflation15. 
5. Empirical Results and Discussion 
All the series, other than interest rates, are taken at the 1993-94 base period and converted to 
their natural logarithms. In each equation of the VAR model, a full set of monthly dummies 
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 Forecasted inflation is obtained from fitting AR (1) model in WPI inflation series. 
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have been included to take care of deterministic seasonality. The VAR models are estimated 
via Iterated Seemingly Unrelated Regression (ISUR). The standard errors for impulse 
responses and forecast error variance decompositions are obtained via bootstrapping.  
5.1. Stationarity Tests 
We performed the Augmented Dicky Fuller (ADF) test and Phillips Perron (PP), Phillips 
Denis Kwiatkowski, C. B. Peter, Peter Schmidt, and Yongcheol Shin (KPSS), Graham 
Elliott, Thomas J. Rothenberg and James H. Stock (ERS) point optimal test and NG and 
Pierre Perron (Ng-Perron) modified unit root tests for the presence of unit roots in the series. 
These tests16 suggest that all the variables other than the call money rate (CMR) and output 
gap contain a unit root. The results of these tests are given in Table 3. Thus, we used the first 
difference of the variables. The variables entering into the estimation are: oil price inflation, 
change in ffrate, domestic (or WPI) inflation, growth of output, appreciation rate, growth of 
reserve money (gm0) or the call money rate (CMR) as monetary policy instrument variables, 
growth of bank credit (gbc) and  M3 growth (gm3). The appropriate lag length for the VAR 
model estimated has been decided on the basis of Akaike’s Information criterion (AIC).17 The 
number of lags included in the VAR model is two. 
------------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 3 here 
                                             ------------------------------------------------ 
5.2 Results from Benchmark Identification  
                                               
 
16
 If three or more tests suggested the presence of unit root in a series, we have taken series to contain a unit 
root. 
17
  After fitting the VAR with lags as selected by the AIC criterion, the LM test for autocorrelation in the VAR 
residuals has been performed and if residuals are found to be autocorrelated at that number of lags, the number 
of lags has been increased to remove autocorrelation in the residuals.  
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Figure 1 presents the impulse response functions (IRFs) of domestic variables to one standard 
deviation (s.d.) positive shock in M0 growth while figure 2 shows impulse response functions 
of domestic variables to one s.d. CMR shocks. Monetary policy shock, as identified by M0 
growth shock, gives the price puzzle as given positive shock to M0 growth there is a fall in 
inflation. And for output gap, there is a small rise for two months, and then it starts falling. 
The exchange rate also gives a puzzling result as a positive innovation in M0 growth leads to 
an appreciating exchange rate. The credit and M3 growth rise following M0 growth shock for 
approx. four months before falling. After the fall, credit and M3 growth again rise for almost 
two months before the effect of positive shock in M0 growth on them dies down. 
 
We found that growth in reserve money as an instrument of monetary policy is not working 
well. This is mainly due to the fact that composition of reserve money has changed in the 
period considered here, rendering it exogenous to the control of the RBI. The net RBI credit 
to the government and net foreign exchange assets of the RBI, the two main sources which 
determine largely the variation in reserve money, the share of former has remained fairly 
stable for the reference period, and the share of latter has gained importance in the growth of 
reserve money due to growing openness of financial market.   The inflow and outflow of 
foreign capital would not have put a restraint on the RBI’s ability to control reserve money if 
exchange rate would have been completely floated. However, in Indian case, exchange rate 
could be best described as a ‘managed float’ and the RBI intervenes in the foreign exchange 
market to provide a stable corridor for the exchange rate. Under such situation, the expansion 
(and contraction) of foreign exchange reserves and therefore its impact on the money supply, 
remain largely outside the control of the RBI (Ramachandran, 2000). Further, the RBI’s 
ability to conduct OMO without any constraint to successfully sterilize the excess liquidity is 
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often checked by the underdeveloped securities market and the growing market borrowing 
requirement of the government.   
 
------------------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 1 here 
------------------------------------------------ 
The model with the CMR as monetary policy instrument gives theoretically consistent results 
for the major economic variables to one standard deviation positive shock in monetary policy 
instrument (CMR). There is an immediate fall in inflation and outputgap following a positive 
CMR shock. The price puzzle, which emerges when monetary policy shocks are identified by 
M0 growth shock, vanishes when monetary policy shocks are taken as shocks to the interest 
rate (CMR). The behaviour of exchange rate is also in line with the theory (unlike the model 
with M0 growth as monetary policy instrument) as a positive innovation to interest rate leads 
to a rise in (appreciation) of the exchange rate.  This gives evidence in support of the fact that 
the rate variable is more appropriately signalling the stance of monetary policy than the 
quantity variable. 
------------------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 2 here 
------------------------------------------------ 
Table 4 presents the Forecast Error Variance Decompositions (FEVDs) for the model in 
which CMR is used as monetary policy instrument18.  The results of FEVD for inflation show 
that neer is playing an important secondary role in explaining movements in inflation. This 
                                               
 
18
 Since, model with interest rate (CMR) gives theoretically consistent results for impulse responses; we have 
included FEVDs from this model due to space constraints. 
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indicates the sensitivity of domestic inflation to external fluctuations. Outside fluctuations, as 
indicated by shocks to neer, are playing an important role in determining inflation. Inflation 
is affected less by output shocks and more by oil shocks as oil shocks explain almost 11% of 
volatility in inflation at a forecasting horizon of a year. This shows that cost-push factors 
(supply side factors) are more important driving inflation than demand-pull factors (demand 
side factors). It is also noteworthy that Fuel, Power, Light and Lubricant (FPL&L) is one of 
the main constituent series of WPI, representing approximately 14% of the weight in total 
WPI basket at 1993-94 prices. Inflation in FPL&L series was the key driver of overall WPI 
inflation increase in India, mainly after the period of 2000. While the WPI inflation averaged 
at around 5% per annum after 2000, Inflation in FPL&L category increased at the rate of 10% 
per annum from 2000 to 2007 and contributed approximately 48% to the overall increase in 
headline inflation (Agarwal, 2009). The analysis here, shows that with increasing 
globalization of Indian economy, the pass through of international prices to domestic 
inflation has increased and domestic oil, petroleum and lubricants, in particular, become more 
sensitive to changes in international crude oil prices after the dismantling of the Administered 
Price Mechanism (APM) in April, 200219.  
 
Variations in neer are largely explained by its own shocks. The result for bank credit shows 
that it is becoming more responsive to shocks in the interest rate compared to the level of 
economic activity as proxies by output. This suggests the rising sensitivity of credit to interest 
rates than to incomes. Exchange rate shocks are playing an important role in explaining 
                                               
 
19
 As the analysis period here covers the period of 1997 East Asian Crisis, in order to see the influence of 1997 
East Asian financial crisis on the analysis we have included a dummy variable in our model taking value 1 for 
the period 1997 July to 1998 July and 0 otherwise. This period roughly conforms to the period of East Asian 
Crisis. This dummy does not turn out to be significant and inclusion of this dummy does have any effect on the 
results of this exercise. Therefore in the benchmark model, as presented here, we did not include this dummy.  
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variations in credit and M3 growth. This result supports the rising importance of the 
exchange rate channel in the economy. 
 
------------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 4 here 
------------------------------------------------ 
 We found that our benchmark identification with the interest rate as the monetary policy 
instrument gave meaningful results. It captured the changing monetary policy dynamics 
neatly. Estimated contemporaneous structural form coefficients from the VAR model (with 
the interest rate as the monetary policy instrument), as presented in Table 4, further justified 
the identification structure. The estimated contemporaneous structural coefficients supported 
the recursive identification, as the contemporaneous coefficients in their respective equations 
are significant. The coefficient on oil and the foreign interest rate enter positively and 
significantly in the inflation equation. This is indicative of quick pass through of outside 
factors to domestic inflation. The contemporaneous coefficient of output gap is also positive 
and significant in inflation equation. This suggests the demand side changes do affect 
domestic inflation in India.  However, their effect on domestic inflation seems transient (as 
suggested by FEVDs) and in the short to medium run domestic inflation is driven more by 
external factors (as proxies by exchange rate shocks) and supply side factors (as proxies by 
oil price inflation shocks). These coefficients bring out some interesting facts about the 
institutional aspect of the Indian economy in the period after the mid 90s. First, the 
significant coefficients of CDE	and FGH$	in the ‘inflation equation’ support the fact that 
much of the WPI inflation is imported in nature. Second, since the CDE coefficient is positive, 
it indicates the increase in international oil prices increases inflation immediately while the 
FGH$ coefficient is negative indicating that rise in the international interest rate is lowering 
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inflation domestically. This result gives some important insights into the composition of the 
domestic money supply in India. Since, a higher interest rate abroad will result in capital 
outflow from the economy this will, in turn, reduce the domestic money supply and thus 
lower inflation. This provides evidence that capital inflows form a large part of domestic the 
money supply in India. 
 
The significant negative coefficient of IJK in the ‘gbc equation’ implies credit is interest 
sensitive and effect of interest rate on growth of credit is quick. Further, we found in our 
earlier results of FEVDs that credit is not much sensitive to output gap shocks. However, the 
contemporaneous coefficient of output gap in credit equation is significant and positive and 
this suggest that effect of these shocks on growth of credit is immediate and do not last long 
while shocks to interest rate have more permanent effect on credit.  Another interesting point 
is the positive coefficient on inflation in M3 growth equation. This again gives some 
indication about the nature of domestic inflation in India20. It suggests that inflation is 
governed mainly by supply side and external factors and this ‘cost push’ or supply side 
inflation may result in sluggishness in domestic activity and thus keeping in mind the growth 
                                               
 
20
 The fact that inflation in India was mainly supply side generated and imported in nature had been supported 
by the various arguments and analysis presented in various RBI publications from time to time. We have 
collected  few of them to support this argument. They are as following: 
• The inflation rate came under pressure arising from a negative supply shock emanating from shortage 
of few food articles and food products…………” (Pg. No. VI –27, Report on currency and Finance 
1998-99.)  
• On an weighted average basis, the fuel group contributed the maximum to inflation during 2000-
01(Pg.No. I-19, Report on currency and Finance1999-2000.) 
• The inflation outcome was characterized by an absence of demand induced pressures.(Annual Report 
of RBI 2000-01) 
• Reflecting the global situation, inflation in India firmed up in the last quarter of 2002-03, driven up by 
the hardening of international oil prices and supply side pressures on ion items like oil seeds, edible 
oils and oil cakes. (Chapter 3, Pg. No. 47, Annual Report of RBI 2002-03) 
• With increasing globalization of the Indian economy, the pass through of international prices to 
domestic prices is becoming increasingly evident. (Chapter 3, Pg. No. 45, Annual Report of RBI 
2003-04). 
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objective of monetary policy, in response to a rise in inflation, there is an immediate increase 
in M3 to prevent  aggregate demand from falling. 
------------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 5 here 
------------------------------------------------ 
5.3 Comparison of the Benchmark Model with Pure Inflation Targeting Scenario 
The results from benchmark model with CMR as monetary policy instrument indicate that the 
identification strategy adopted here is able to capture the features of the Indian monetary 
policy well and produce theoretically consistent results. This allowed us to use this 
specification to analyze the hypothetical inflation targeting scenario and compare it with the 
current monetary policy procedure of the RBI. Figure 3 and Table 6 presents the IRFS and 
FEVDs respectively of the variables to monetary policy shocks in a hypothetical inflation 
targeting scenario as built in benchmark identification. In this scenario, positive interest rate 
shocks generate lesser volatility in inflation as compared to benchmark scenario. Further, in 
this scenario, the initial effect of interest rate shocks on output gap is stronger, and there is a 
bigger contraction in output gap while it is lesser on exchange rate and there is much smaller 
appreciation of exchange rate as compared to benchmark case. These results suggest that 
under inflation targeting scenario, as built in the model here, changes in monetary policy 
instrument (interest rate) feed into inflation through changes in aggregate demand while in 
the benchmark case, these changes seem to feed into inflation through exchange rates.  The 
IRFs in two scenarios also suggest an important caveat that there is greater volatility in 
exchange rate following a negative monetary policy shock  in ‘inflation targeting’ scenario 
after initial four months than in the benchmark case though initial effect of this shock is 
lesser.  
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------------------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 3 here 
               ------------------------------------------------ 
In an alternative specification, when forecasts of inflation were used instead of actual 
inflation, the response of inflation forecasts to the positive interest rate shock was milder than 
the actual inflation. There was still a fall in inflation following negative monetary policy 
shock but the magnitude of the fall was smaller. This result seems to suggest that if inflation 
forecasts were used as an intermediate target in a inflation targeting framework, stronger 
monetary policy reaction is needed to have the same effect on goal variable (inflation 
forecasts) than would have required if actual inflation were used as a goal variable.  The 
response of other variables (output, exchange rate, credit M3 growth) to the positive interest 
rate shock were qualitatively similar as found in the ‘pure inflation targeting’ scenario.  
 
The FEVDs results further give evidence in support of the results of IRFs. The shocks to 
output gap explain larger variation of inflation, exchange rate, credit and money supply in the 
economy as compared to the benchmark case. For example, in the benchmark scenario, 
shocks to output gap roughly explains 0.4%, 3% and 0.3% while in inflation targeting 
scenario, as built here, shocks to output gap roughly explains 10%, 10% and 17% variance of 
inflation, growth money supply (M3) and credit respectively at the forecasting horizon of the 
year. Further, the share of exchange rate shocks explaining variation of inflation, credit and 
money supply in the economy is reduced as compared to benchmark case. For example, in 
the benchmark scenario, shocks to exchange rate roughly explains 14%, 13% and 10% while 
in inflation targeting scenario, as built here, shocks to exchange rate roughly explains 3%, 8% 
and 1% variance of inflation, growth money supply (M3) and credit respectively at the 
forecasting horizon of the year.  These FEVDs results support our earlier results of IRFs that 
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much of changes in monetary policy feed into the system through changes in aggregate 
demand in inflation targeting scenario in contrast to the benchmark case where these changes 
feed through exchange rate. 
------------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 6 here 
------------------------------------------------ 
The estimated structural contemporaneous coefficients do not change much across the two 
scenarios.     
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 7 here 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
6. Conclusions 
This paper builds a short-run Vector Autoregression model of monetary policy for India. The 
RBI’s reaction function or feedback rule to changes in the foreign shocks and non policy 
variables determines the setting of the policy instrument variable. In the base-case scenario, 
the monetary policy instrument is set after looking at current values of inflation, output and 
exchange rate. This is more in line with the ‘multiple indicators’ approach followed by the 
RBI. The model with interest rate as monetary policy instrument behaved consistently. 
Responses to monetary shock are in directions suggested by theory and thus, it can be 
considered as a good approximation of reality.  
 
Therefore in the above structure, we put in the case of ‘pure inflation targeting’ to see how 
hypothetical inflation targeting regime would work for India. For this, we made monetary 
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policy instrument to react only to inflation contemporaneously. The hypothetical inflation 
targeting regime , as built here, suggests that demand effects of changes in interest rate is 
stronger than exchange rate effects.  The increase in interest rate (or negative monetary policy 
shocks) does not appreciate exchange rate as much in the inflation targeting scenario as in the 
benchmark case and inflation stabilization comes basically from output gap changes in 
inflation targeting scenario. This very basic model on the working of inflation targeting 
regime for India suggest that much of the changes in economy are operating through changes 
in domestic demand in inflation targeting scenario in contrast to the benchmark case where 
these changes operate through exchange rate. This seems a better a outcome over benchmark 
case (more in line with the Multiple Indicator Approach of the RBI) primarily because 
changes in exchange rate are more complex to decipher as exchange rate, besides being 
affected by the realized changes in interest rate, would also be affected by the expectations of 
future interest rate. And also, there is an evidence that in inflation targeting scenario, the 
potential conflict between exchange rate and interest rate in an open economy context, one of 
the main monetary policy dilemma of the RBI, seems to be mitigated as initial reaction of 
exchange rate to interest rate changes are milder in comparison to multiple indicator 
(benchmark) scenario. 
The main policy implication, as the analysis here on two alternative monetary policy regimes 
seem to suggest, that the RBI may achieve a better monetary management shifting to a 
inflation targeting framework. Another policy implication is on the management of inflation 
and credit situation in the economy and it seems that RBI may be able to affect inflation 
outcomes immediately by altering demand side factors. However, their effect on inflation will 
be transient; sustained and stable inflation situation can be achieved by improving the supply 
side of the economy. It also appears that credit in the economy is affected by direct interest 
rate changes and also indirect effects of interest rate changes which feed into it through 
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changes in demand side factors. However, the effect of demand side factors on credit is 
temporary, which implies that RBI should exercise caution on interest rate changes to alter 
credit situation in the economy as any effect of interest rate change on credit might be 
stronger immediately than what would have been required (or intended).  
 
The VAR model also highlighted the determinants of inflation volatility in India since mid 
1990s. Inflation in India is mainly affected by global supply factors and external fluctuations. 
Moreover, the pass through of these international shocks to domestic inflation is quite rapid 
as the estimated structural contemporaneous coefficient from VAR model showed. 
 
An interesting area for future research would be to develop the theoretical model for 
monetary policy in India incorporating the stylized facts21 as suggested by the VAR model in 
this exercise and use this for evaluating the inflation targeting monetary policy framework for 
India. Another interesting extension of this study could be to use the long run restrictions or 
combination of short run and long run restriction structure to identify and examine impact of 
monetary policy shocks on real economy.  
  
                                               
 
21
 The VAR model suggested ‘New Keynesian’ framework with incorporation some form stickiness in the 
prices giving rise to non-neutral effects of monetary policy is needed to prepare the framework suitable for the 
evolution of monetary policy. Second, call money rate shocks gave theoretically consistent results for the major 
macro economic variables (output, inflation and exchange rate). This suggests that rate variables are better in 
signalling the stance of monetary policy for India than quantity variables and justifies the use of nominal interest 
rate as an instrument. Third, there is a growing importance of exchange rate channel in the transmission of 
monetary policy in India. The exchange rate shocks are playing central role in explaining the volatility of 
inflation, interest rate, growth of credit and money supply growth in India. 
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Appendix: Tables and Figures 
Figure 1:  Positive M0 Shock (Positive Monetary Shock) in a Benchmark Case 
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Figure 2:  Positive CMR Shock (Negative Monetary Shock) in a Benchmark Case 
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Figure 3: Positive CMR Shock (Negative Monetary Shock) in an Inflation Targeting 
Case 
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Table 1: Main Attributes of Monetary policy In India 
 
Attribute Mid 1980s to 1998-99 1998-99 to Present 
Objective(s) 1)Price Stability 
2)Ensuring adequate flow of credit 
to productive sectors of the 
economy 
 
1)Price Stability 
2)Ensuring adequate flow of credit 
to productive sectors of the 
economy 
Transmission 
Mechanism (or 
intermediate 
target) 
Monetary Targeting with annual 
growth in broad money (M3) as 
intermediate target 
Multiple Indicator approach with 
rate of returns in different markets 
(namely money, capital, currency, 
external etc.) as intermediate 
target 
 
Operating 
Procedure 
(Instruments) 
Direct instruments namely interest 
rate regulations, selective credit 
control  and Cash Reserve Ratio 
(CRR) 
Indirect  instruments namely repo 
operations under Liquidity 
Management Facility (LAF) and 
Open Market Operations(OMO)  
Source: Agarwal (2009) 
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Table 2: Results of Pair-wise Granger Causality Test 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Null Hypothesis F-Statistic Prob.  
Non-Policy Block 
 inf does not Granger Cause outputgap  0.936 0.446 
 outputgap does not Granger Cause inf  3.900 0.005 
 neer does not Granger Cause outputgap  4.445 0.002 
 outputgap does not Granger Cause neer  5.949 0.000 
 neer does not Granger Cause inf  0.816 0.517 
 inf does not Granger Cause neer  2.953 0.023 
Policy Block   
 gm3 does not Granger Cause CMR  0.694 0.597 
 CMR does not Granger Cause gm3  2.388 0.056 
 gbc does not Granger Cause CMR  1.417 0.234 
 CMR does not Granger Cause gbc  1.474 0.216 
 gbc does not Granger Cause gm3  1.112 0.355 
 gm3 does not Granger Cause gbc  4.485 0.002 
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Table 3: Results for unit root tests  
 
Variable ADF Test PP Test KPSS Test 
ERS Point 
Optimal 
Test 
Ng-Perron 
Modified 
Unit root 
Test 
OIL -1.17 -1.07 0.80*** 6.98 -3.91 
FFRATE -0.98 -1.05 0.92*** 19.37 -1.19 
WPI -0.56 -0.48 1.21*** 632.03 1.68 
Outputgap -7.78*** -7.45*** 0.01 0.57*** -134.34*** 
CMR -6.03*** -5.87*** 0.70** 2.45** -9.11** 
M0 0.06 1.84 1.21*** 231.53 2.03 
BC 1.92 2.26 1.22*** 1258.4 2.22 
M3 -1.54 -3.34** -1.21*** 4141.1 1.57 
NEER -0.11 -0.39 0.63** 1.47*** -17.93*** 
After First Differencing 
∆OIL -10.45*** -10.47*** 0.15 0.55*** -45.1*** 
∆FFRATE -5.07*** -5.05*** 0.12 2.13** -10.89** 
∆WPI -8.34*** -8.22*** 0.05 0.52*** -50.50*** 
∆ Outputgap - - - - - 
∆CMR - - - - - 
∆M0 -11.18*** -16.91*** 0.50** 0.94*** -3.78 
∆BC -10.64*** -10.65*** 0.38* 0.58*** 54.43*** 
∆M3 -7.92*** -9.76*** 0.43* 0.11*** -163.05*** 
∆NEER -7.82*** -12.13*** 0.14 1.95*** -46.94*** 
 
Notes: (1.) For the ADF test the lag length was selected by using SIC (Modified SIC for ERS 
& Ng-Perron) values. (2.) For PP and KPSS test the optimal bandwidth was selected by 
Newey-West method using Bartlett kernel. (3.) All the unit root tests were performed with the 
assumption of constant term in the logarithm of the series (except for CMR and ffrate) with 
the null hypothesis of unit root for all tests except for KPSS test where null was stationarity 
(4.) * (**) *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
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Table 4: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition in a Benchmark Case 
(CMR as Monetary Policy Instrument) 
Forecast Error Variance of Inflation as Explained by Shocks to 
Horizon oil ffrate outputgap inf neer CMR gm3 gbc 
1 10.40(6.9) 4.18(5.6) 0.03(1.5) 85.39(7.5) 0.00(0.0) 0.00(0.0) 0.00(0.0) 0.00(0.0) 
3 10.72(5.6) 7.01(5.6) 0.25(1.7) 64.64(7.3) 12.60(6.9) 0.14(0.8) 3.26(2.4) 1.38(1.5) 
6 10.80(5.5) 7.13(5.2) 0.38(1.8) 62.17(7.4) 13.54(6.8) 1.02(1.8) 3.12(2.2) 1.82(1.8) 
12 10.79(5.4) 7.36(5.2) 0.39(1.8) 61.97(7.4) 13.51(6.7) 1.03(1.9) 3.12(2.2) 1.83(1.8) 
 
Forecast Error Variance of Outputgap as Explained by Shocks to 
Horizon oil ffrate outputgap inf neer CMR gm3 gbc 
1 0.86(3.2) 0.37(3.1) 98.77(4.3) 0.00(0.0) 0.00(0.0) 0.00(0.0) 0.00(0.0) 0.00(0.0) 
3 0.88(3.5) 1.26(4.3) 92.72(6.5) 3.88(3.4) 0.55(2.3) 0.13(0.7) 0.52(1.8) 0.06(1.4) 
6 0.95(3.4) 1.40(4.8) 91.73(7.1) 3.98(3.5) 0.94(2.8) 0.31(1.1) 0.54(1.8) 0.15(1.5) 
12 0.98(3.3) 1.70(5.2) 91.38(7.3) 3.98(3.5) 0.94(2.8) 0.33(1.2) 0.54(1.8) 0.15(1.5) 
 
Forecast Error Variance of NEER as Explained by Shocks to 
Horizon oil ffrate outputgap inf neer CMR gm3 gbc 
1 1.45(3.8) 0.31(2.0) 0.73(1.6) 2.78(3.4) 94.73(4.8) 0.00(0.0) 0.00(0.0) 0.00(0.0) 
3 2.58(4.2) 1.44(3.3) 0.80(2.4) 3.10(3.3) 87.80(6.4) 1.26(1.9) 2.90(2.6) 0.12(1.2) 
6 2.68(4.2) 1.63(3.4) 0.90(2.5) 3.28(3.2) 86.99(6.7) 1.27(1.8) 2.68(3.0) 0.24(1.3) 
12 2.68(4.1) 1.71(3.4) 0.90(2.5) 3.28(3.2) 86.89(6.7) 1.27(1.9) 3.02(2.6) 0.25(1.3) 
 
Forecast Error Variance of CMR as Explained by Shocks to 
Horizon oil ffrate outputgap inf neer CMR gm3 gbc 
1 0.96(3.4) 0.21(1.5) 0.07(1.3) 0.36(2.1) 0.38(1.5) 98.02(4.5) 0.00(0.0) 0.00(0.0) 
3 1.44(3.6) 0.24(2.3) 1.31(2.7) 2.41(4.2) 6.46(6.2) 84.74(9.3) 0.83(1.8) 2.58(3.5) 
6 1.54(3.6) 0.59(3.5) 1.86(3.6) 2.49(4.1) 6.73(6.1) 82.22(10.1) 1.10(1.7) 3.46(4.0) 
12 1.53(3.7) 0.71(4.0) 1.99(3.9) 2.48(4.0) 6.81(6.1) 81.82(10.4) 1.10(1.7) 3.57(4.1) 
 
Note: Figures in brackets are standard errors calculated via boot strapping method. 
 
 
 
 
Forecast Error Variance of GM3 as Explained by Shocks to 
Horizon oil ffrate outputgap inf neer CMR gm3 gbc 
1 0.30(2.6) 0.27(2.0) 1.34(2.1) 5.07(4.5) 0.51(2.3) 2.86(3.7) 89.65(6.8) 0.00(0.0) 
3 2.97(4.2) 0.79(2.3) 2.73(3.2) 7.05(4.4) 8.53(4.4) 2.19(2.6) 70.78(7.3) 4.97(3.1) 
6 3.11(3.9) 0.81(2.3) 2.66(3.2) 7.23(3.9) 12.69(5.6) 2.49(2.4) 65.29(7.3) 5.71(3.1) 
12 3.12(3.9) 0.88(2.3) 2.66(3.2) 7.23(3.9) 12.69(5.6) 2.49(2.4) 65.20(7.3) 5.73(3.1) 
Forecast Error Variance of GBC as Explained by Shocks to 
Horizon oil ffrate outputgap inf neer CMR gm3 gbc 
1 0.01(2.5) 0.10(1.8) 0.02(1.3) 0.01(1.0) 0.02(1.5) 17.89(11.0) 24.56(7.7) 57.35(9.7) 
3 0.05(3.0) 2.78(3.8) 0.11(2.1) 1.45(2.8) 8.23(5.4) 15.97(8.7) 22.30(6.6) 49.34(7.7) 
6 0.83(2.9) 3.47(4.1) 0.29(2.4) 1.38(2.6) 10.06(6.1) 15.70(8.1) 21.30(6.1) 47.10(7.4) 
12 0.88(3.0) 3.64(4.3) 0.29(2.4) 1.39(2.6) 10.05(6.1) 15.74(8.1) 21.24(6.1) 46.91(7.4) 
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Table 5: Estimated Structural Contemporaneous Coefficients 
(Benchmark Case) 
 
oil ffrate outputgap inf neer CMR gm3 gbc 
oil 7.941*** 
(0.54) 
ffrate 
-1.305* 7.652*** 
(0.77) (0.52) 
outputgap 
-2.463*** -0.764 35.541*** 
     (0.79) (0.74) (2.42) 
     inf 5.107*** -1.729** 9.742*** 253.068*** 
    (0.88) (0.75) (3.48) (17.22) 
    neer 1.518 -0.466 0.741 14.837 59.916*** 
   (0.95) (0.76) (3.55) (24.37) (4.08) 
CMR 1.241 -0.165 -2.889 8.240 0.616 0.415*** 
(0.96) (0.76) (3.55) (24.40) (5.77) (0.03) 
gm3 1.534 0.326 -2.656 42.356* -10.785* -0.020 149.198*** 
(0.97) (0.76) (3.562 (24.58) (5.81) (0.04) (10.15) 
gbc -0.222 0.840 16.114*** 25.890 11.599** -0.173*** 108.187*** 99.292*** 
(0.98) (0.76) (3.73) (24.81) (5.91) (0.04) (16.13) (6.76) 
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Table 6: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition in a Pure Inflation Targeting Case 
 
Forecast Error Variance of Outputgap as Explained by Shocks to 
Horizon oil ffrate outputgap inf neer CMR gm3 gbc 
1 2.55(4.7) 0.89(1.7) 96.55(6.3) 0.00(0.0) 0.00(0.0) 0.00(0.0) 0.00(0.0) 0.00(0.0) 
3 3.58(5.2) 1.06(1.2) 79.81(7.2) 0.19(0.7) 7.81(4.0) 2.98(1.9) 0.11(0.4) 4.47(2.6) 
6 3.12(5.4) 2.06(3.1) 74.39(8.1) 0.56(1.3) 8.79(4.9) 3.58(2.5) 0.29(0.4) 7.22(4.4) 
12 3.09(5.4) 2.14(3.4) 74.19(8.2) 0.60(1.3) 8.81(4.9) 3.61(2.5) 0.32(0.4) 7.25(4.4) 
 
 
Forecast Error Variance of CMR as Explained by Shocks to 
Horizon oil ffrate outputgap inf neer CMR gm3 gbc 
1 1.02(1.9) 0.05(0.4) 0.80(1.7) 0.10(0.6) 0.01(0.2) 98.02(2.7) 0.00(0.0) 0.00(0.0) 
3 0.83(1.6) 0.18(0.7) 0.76(1.6) 2.49(3.2) 4.69(3.9) 86.90(6.0) 1.41(1.7) 2.75(2.8) 
6 1.84(2.6) 0.33(1.2) 1.75(2.0) 2.51(3.1) 4.65(4.0) 82.67(7.8) 1.86(1.8) 4.39(3.9) 
12 1.98(2.8) 0.68(2.1) 1.86(2.2) 2.48(3.1) 4.60(3.9) 81.48(8.8) 1.83(1.8) 5.09(4.4) 
 
Forecast Error Variance of GM3 as Explained by Shocks to 
Horizon oil ffrate outputgap inf neer CMR gm3 gbc 
1 0.75(1.7) 0.32(1.1) 1.41(2.2) 2.94(3.2) 2.95(3.1) 0.22(0.9) 91.41(5.2) 0.00(0.0) 
3 1.33(2.5) 0.52(1.2) 6.39(3.7) 4.13(3.5) 5.79(3.6) 0.29(0.9) 76.31(6.7) 5.25(3.8) 
6 2.44(2.9) 0.56(1.1) 9.19(4.2) 4.66(3.3) 8.22(3.8) 0.76(1.0) 68.43(7.8) 5.75(3.6) 
12 2.44(2.9) 0.63(1.1) 9.25(4.2) 4.69(3.2) 8.29(3.8) 0.82(1.0) 68.02(8.0) 5.86(3.6) 
 
Forecast Error Variance of GBC as Explained by Shocks to 
Horizon oil ffrate outputgap inf neer CMR gm3 gbc 
1 0.00(0.1) 0.36(1.2) 14.97(6.3) 0.04(0.4) 0.22(0.8) 9.98(5.0) 25.64(6.4) 53.77(7.2) 
3 2.45(5.7) 0.81(1.5) 15.46(6.3) 0.56(1.1) 0.56(1.1) 8.03(4.2) 22.06(6.0) 50.07(6.7) 
6 4.33(6.7) 1.31(2.1) 16.46(6.6) 0.60(1.0) 0.77(1.0) 7.79(4.0) 20.72(6.0) 48.02(8.1) 
12 4.34(6.6) 1.37(2.3) 16.59(6.7) 0.62(1.0) 0.82(1.0) 7.81(4.0) 20.55(6.1) 47.89(8.1) 
Note: Figures in brackets are standard errors calculated via boot strapping method. 
 
 
 
Forecast Error Variance of Inflation as Explained by Shocks to 
Horizon oil ffrate outputgap inf neer CMR gm3 gbc 
1 11.27(5.5) 2.47(2.5) 4.70(3.3) 81.57(9.3) 0.00(0.0) 0.00(0.0) 0.00(0.0) 0.00(0.0) 
3 11.73(4.8) 6.11(4.2) 9.98(4.5) 63.84(7.5) 1.62(1.6) 0.06(0.3) 3.58(2.1) 3.08(2.4) 
6 11.31(4.6) 6.72(4.5) 9.81(4.4) 62.41(7.6) 2.83(2.1) 0.27(0.4) 3.53(2.2) 3.12(2.4) 
12 11.25(4.6) 6.81(4.7) 9.80(4.4) 62.28(7.6) 2.85(2.1) 0.34(0.4) 3.54(2.2) 3.13(2.4) 
Forecast Error Variance of NEER as Explained by Shocks to 
Horizon oil ffrate outputgap inf neer CMR gm3 gbc 
1 2.11(2.7) 0.22(0.9) 0.00(0.1) 0.33(1.1) 97.34(3.1) 0.00(0.0) 0.00(0.0) 0.00(0.0) 
3 6.91(5.7) 0.24(0.8) 11.55(5.1) 0.92(1.3) 76.76(8.2) 0.79(1.2) 1.03(1.5) 1.03(1.50) 
6 6.33(5.1) 1.26(1.7) 13.29(5.5) 1.73(1.9) 71.03(8.7) 0.95(1.2) 3.70(2.5) 3.70(2.49) 
12 6.31(5.1) 1.42(1.9) 13.30(5.5) 1.77(2.0) 70.72(8.8) 0.99(1.2) 3.77(2.5) 3.77(2.51) 
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Table 7: Estimated Structural Contemporaneous Coefficients 
(Pure Inflation Targeting Case) 
 
oil ffrate outputgap inf neer CMR gm3 gbc 
oil 7.941***        
(0.54)        
ffrate -1.305* 7.652***       
(0.77) (0.52)       
outputgap -2.463*** -0.764 35.541***      
(0.79) (0.74) (2.42)      
inf 5.107*** -1.729** 9.742*** 253.068***     
(0.88) (0.75) (3.48) (17.22)     
neer 1.518 -0.466 0.741 14.837 59.916***    
(0.95) (0.76) (3.55) (24.37) (4.08)    
CMR 1.141 -0.253 0.000 13.303 0.000 0.415***   
(0.96) (0.76) (0.0) (23.50) (0.00) (0.03)   
gm3 1.534 0.326 -2.656 42.356* 
-10.785* -0.020 149.198***  
(0.97) (0.76) (3.56) (24.58) (5.81) (0.04) (10.15)  
gbc -0.222 0.840 16.114*** 25.890 11.599** -0.173*** 108.187*** 99.292*** 
(0.98) (0.76) (3.73) (24.81) (5.91) (0.04) (16.13) (6.76) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
